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An Unreasonable Expectation? Warrantless Searches
of Cell Phones
I. INTRODUCTION
Nick was speeding down the road going 38 mph, traveling in a
30 mph zone, when he saw the familiar red and blue of a police
officer’s lights in his rearview mirror. Irritated by the delay, Nick
pulled over. When Officer Jacobs walked up, he asked to see Nick’s
license and registration. Obediently, Nick handed over the requested
documents, not realizing his license was expired. Officer Jacobs
looked at Nick’s license and muttered under his breath something
about “scofflaw,” and asked Nick to step out of the car. Telling Nick
that he was under arrest, Jacobs handcuffed Nick and read him the
familiar Miranda rights. Officer Jacobs then proceeded to search Nick
incident-to-arrest. When Officer Jacobs found Nick’s cell phone, he
opened the pictures gallery. In the file, Officer Jacobs saw legal, nude
pictures of Nick and his girlfriend together in various sexual
positions.
Later, after taking Nick in to be booked, Officer Jacobs shared
the pictures with Sergeant Brandon. Sergeant Brandon proceeded to
share the pictures with additional officers at the station. Eventually
Brandon and the other officers shared the pictures with various
members of the public, knowing that Nick intended to keep the
pictures private. Because of the publicity of the pictures, Nick lost
his job, broke up with his girlfriend, and was publically humiliated. 1
This story demonstrates the dangers of the government having
the power to search a cell phone without a warrant. Cell phones
today have nearly the capabilities of a personal computer. 2 A survey
last year revealed that 88% of adults in the United States own a cell
phone, and 55% of all adult cell phone owners use their phones for

1. These facts were based on Newhard v. Borders, 649 F. Supp. 2d 440 (W.D. Va. 2009).
2. See Sam Biddle, The iPhone 5 is More Powerful than the Fastest PowerBook Ever Made,
GIZMODO (Sept. 17, 2012), http://gizmodo.com/5943988/the-iphone-5-is-more-powerful-thanthe-fastest-powerbook-ever-made (stating that the iPhone 5 is more powerful than the 2005
model Powerbook, a discontinued line of Apple laptop computers).
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Internet or email. 3 The amount and type of information that can be
stored on a cell phone includes “phonebook information,
appointment calendars, text messages, call logs, photographs, audio
and video recordings, web browsing history, electronic documents
and user location information,” 4 and more. One court noted that in
order to carry the same amount of personal information contained in
cell phones today, a person would need to carry with them “one or
more large suitcases, if not file cabinets.” 5 Because most of this
information is of a personal or business nature, it is not surprising
that people expect privacy in their cell phones and the information
contained on them.
The widespread use of cell phones is a relatively recent
phenomenon, 6 and courts have struggled to fit them into existing
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. In particular, the courts have not
reached a consensus regarding the legality of warrantless cell phone
searches incident-to-arrest. The Supreme Court has yet to rule on
the issue, and the Circuit courts are split. 7 Additionally, scholars
have also failed to come to a consensus. 8 With the vast majority of
adults using cell phones, the United States Supreme Court needs to
rule on the important issue of warrantless searches incident-to-arrest
of cell phones. Part II of this paper addresses the history and
justification of warrantless searches starting with Katz v. United
States, 9 and exceptions to the general warrant requirement in Chimel
3. Aaron Smith, Cell Internet Use 2012, PEW INTERNET (June 26, 2012),
http://pewinternet.org/Reports/2012/Cell-Internet-Use-2012/Main-Findings/Cell-InternetUse.aspx.
4. Schlossberg v. Solesbee, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1170 (D. Or. 2012).
5. Id. at 1169.
6. In 2000, only about 28.3% of U.S. adults reported owning their own cell phone.
PETER TUCKEL & HARRY O’NEILL, OWNERSHIP AND USAGE PATTERNS OF CELL PHONES: 2000–2005,
available
at
http://www.amstat.org/sections/srms/proceedings/y2005/Files/JSM2005000345.pdf.
7. For a list of cases upholding cell phone searches incident-to-arrest, see Adam M.
Gershowitz, Password Protected? Can a Password Save Your Cell Phone from a Search Incident to
Arrest?, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1125, 1137 n.66 (2011). And, for a list of cases rejecting warrantless cell
phone searches incident-to-arrest, see id. at 1139 n.76. As can be seen from these lists, and as
will be shown in this paper, the courts do not always agree on this issue, even within a single
circuit.
8. Charles E. MacLean, But, Your Honor, a Cell Phone is not a Cigarette Pack: An Immodest
Call for a Return to the Chimel Justifications for Cell Phone Memory Searches Incident to Lawful Arrest,
2012 FED. CTS. L. REV. 38.
9. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).

1364

DO NOT DELETE

1363

2/6/2014 11:15 AM

An Unreasonable Expectation?

v. California 10 and Arizona v. Gant. 11 Part III of this paper examines
the array of approaches taken by the various courts that have
addressed this issue, with emphasis on the reasons and justifications
given by the various courts. Part IV explains that because the courts
have failed to fully appreciate the extensive role cell phones play in
modern society and the attendant expectation of privacy, existing
jurisprudence fails to appropriately address cell phone searches
incident-to-arrest. Section V presents two possible theories under
which the Supreme Court could settle the uncertain law regarding
warrantless cell phone searches incident-to-arrest. As will be
explained more fully below, the Court could extend its Arizona v.
Gant decision, allowing cell phone searches incident-to-arrest only for
evidence relating to the crime of arrest. Alternatively, the Court
could require a warrant for essentially all cell phone searches,
recognizing the high expectation of privacy inherent in cell phones.
II. SEARCH INCIDENT-TO-ARREST: LEGAL JUSTIFICATIONS AND
EXCEPTIONS
The Supreme Court has famously stated: “the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places.” 12 This important principle
is often lost in the maze of exceptions to the warrant requirement of
the Fourth Amendment. In relation to cell phone searches, two
exceptions to the rule against warrantless searches stand out. First,
the search incident-to-arrest exception, which allows law
enforcement to search a person at the time of arrest, has been
exploited by the courts to allow warrantless searches of cell phones
incident-to-arrest, exposing the personal, private information in a
cell phone. Second, the automobile exception, which allows law
enforcement to warrantlessly search a vehicle in certain situations,
has also been used as a loophole permitting the government to
warrantlessly search a cell phone. This section presents the
foundational Fourth Amendment case of Katz v. United States and
then examines the origins and rationales behind the two exceptions
to the general proscription of warrantless searches presented above.

10. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
11. 556 U.S. 332 (2008).
12. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
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A. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy: Katz
In the landmark case of Katz v. United States, the Court recognized
that what a person seeks to keep private could be protected by the
Constitution, even if the person is in public. 13 The Court also
recognized that modern technology had begun to change societal
expectations of privacy. In Katz, the government warrantlessly placed
a listening and recording device on the outside of a public telephone
booth.14 Even though the government agents exercised restraint in
the use of the device, listening only to conversations made by the
suspect and not by other members of the public, the court still found
the warrantless intrusion prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.15
The Court reasoned that if the Constitution were read so narrowly as
to protect conversations on the telephone only when they are made
on a private phone, this would “ignore the vital role that the public
telephone has come to play in private communication.” 16 While
public telephone booths do not play quite the vital role in private
communication now that they once did, this still shows that the
Court recognized that as technology changed, so did the public’s
perception of what was a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Generally, “a search conducted without a warrant issued upon
probable cause is ‘per se unreasonable . . . subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’” 17 The Katz
Court attempted to set out the test to determine when a search is
reasonable. In Justice Harlan’s concurrence, he distilled a rule out of
the majority opinion’s reasoning. In what has later become
recognized as the de facto test, Justice Harlan noted that the majority
decision’s rule comprised two parts: “first that a person have
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second,
that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
‘reasonable.’” 18 Unfortunately, all too often courts use the reasoning
in Katz to justify a host of confusing exceptions to the warrant
requirement, even if under the Katz test a person could reasonably
expect privacy.

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

1366

Id.
Id. at 348.
Id. at 359.
Id. at 352.
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 357).

Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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B. Chimel v. California and the Search Incident-to-Arrest Exception
The most widely used justification for searching cell phones is
the search incident-to-arrest exception. When analyzing the search
incident-to-arrest exception courts often have had to decide whether
police can search items in the arrestee’s possession, like luggage,
purses, and other containers. Today, courts attempt to analogize
these types of containers to cell phones to justify a cell phone search
incident-to-arrest. It was in Chimel v. California that the justifications
for warrantless searches incident-to-arrest really took form. 19 The
Court held that it is reasonable to search a person incident-to-arrest
in order to remove weapons that could threaten the safety of the
arresting officers and to secure destructible evidence. 20 The area that
an officer can search according to Chimel includes both the “arrestee’s
person and the area ‘within his immediate control’—construing that
phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession
of a weapon or destructible evidence.” 21
Preventing violence against officers making arrests is an
important public policy. Police face a considerable amount of danger
every day; it makes sense to take any reasonable precaution to
prevent further danger, without violating constitutional principles.
Similarly, it is reasonable to prevent the destruction of evidence.
When arresting a suspect, it is likely that the suspect will try to
destroy any incriminating evidence. Public policy also dictates that
reasonable, constitutional steps be taken to prevent this destruction
of evidence. However, the rationales used to establish the search
incident-to-arrest exception in Chimel suggest an implicit limitation.
If the suspect cannot access a weapon or evidence, he cannot use the
weapon to harm others and cannot destroy evidence. Any further
search should require a search warrant. 22
Initially, Chimel’s rationales seemed to provide clear limits on the
search incident-to-arrest exception. However, later courts found it
difficult to define the appropriate parameters of what constitutes a
proper search incident-to-arrest, especially when it came to evidence.

19. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). It is worth noting that the search incidentto-arrest exception first started taking form in dicta in 1914 in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S.
383, 392 (1914).
20. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 768.
21. Id. at 763.
22. Id.
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One important case that attempted to clarify the extent of a search
incident-to-arrest after Chimel was United States v. Robinson. 23
In Robinson, an officer performed a routine traffic stop and had
probable cause to arrest the driver. 24 When the officer arrested the
driver, he also made a search incident-to-arrest of the driver’s
person, discovering a crumpled up cigarette package. 25 When the
officer felt the package, he could tell there was something other than
cigarettes inside, so he opened the package, finding heroin. 26 Even
though the officer had no reason to believe that the package was a
weapon, or that the driver was destroying evidence, 27 the Supreme
Court held that a lawful arrest “establishes the authority to search”
and that during a lawful arrest “a full search of the person is not only
an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment,
but is also a ‘reasonable’ search.” 28
The Court was especially unwilling to second-guess the officer’s
actions in performing the search. 29 The Court reasoned that an
officer’s authority to perform the search did not “depend on what a
court may later decide was the probability in a particular arrest
situation that weapons or evidence would in fact be found upon the
person of the suspect.” 30 Ultimately, the Court found that because
the officer found the package while conducting a lawful search, he
was entitled to search the package and seize the evidence contained
inside. 31 With this broad holding, the Court radically expanded the
power of the police to search without a warrant beyond the
rationales originally offered in Chimel.
In subsequent years, the Supreme Court and lower courts have
further broadened the contours of the Chimel rule. In New York v.
Belton, the Court held that police could search any container (open or
closed) within reach of the arrestee, 32 defining an open container as

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
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414 U.S. 218 (1973).

Id. at 221.
Id. at 223.
Id.
Id. at 251–52.
Id. at 235.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 235–36.
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 461 (1981).
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“any object capable of holding another object.” 33 In United States v.
Edwards, the Court held that clothing could be seized and tested for
evidence. 34 Other courts have allowed, incident-to-arrest, the
government to search wallets, 35 an address book, 36 hand-held
luggage, 37 and a woman’s purse. 38 From these cases, it seems that
almost anything a person may carry on them capable of holding or
concealing something, may be searched incident-to-arrest.39 It
appears that Justice Powell was correct when he said, “an individual
lawfully subjected to a custodial arrest retains no significant Fourth
Amendment interest in the privacy of his person.” 40
The problem is that the Supreme Court has found it necessary to
redefine what constitutes a lawful search incident-to-arrest many
times, carving out categories and exceptions, leaving many questions
unanswered, and leaving lower courts to make inapt comparisons.
For example, courts often compare a cell phone to a closed
container. However, as will be shown below, this is not a good
comparison and is an alarming infringement on a person’s
reasonable expectation of privacy.

C. The Automobile Exception: Gant
Closely related to the search incident-to-arrest exception is the
automobile exception. Police often use the automobile exception as
an excuse to warrantlessly search cell phones. The automobile
exception allows a warrantless search of a vehicle incident-toarrest. 41
In the seminal case of Arizona v. Gant, police arrested the
defendant for driving on a suspended license. 42 After handcuffing
33. Id. at 460 n.4.
34. United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 804 (1974).
35. United States v. Sheehan, 583 F.2d 30, 32 (1st Cir. 1978).
36. Unites States v. Rodriguez, 995 F.2d 776, 778 (7th Cir. 1993).
37. United States v. Garcia, 605 F.2d 349, 355 (7th Cir. 1979).
38. United States v. Moreno, 569 F.2d 1049, 1052 (9th Cir. 1978).
39. This is especially true if the court finds that the item the person is carrying is
associated with the body of the person. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977) (a
delayed warrantless search of a person, including property “immediately associated with the
person of the arrestee,” at the time of arrest is valid).
40. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 237 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring)
(emphasis added).
41. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
42. Id. at 335.
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the defendant and securing him in the back of the patrol car, the
police conducted a search of the defendant’s car and discovered
cocaine in the pocket of a jacket in the backseat. 43 The Court held
that in order for a warrantless search of an automobile incident-toarrest to be lawful, the arrestee must either be “within reaching
distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search” or
the police must reasonably believe that the passenger compartment
contains evidence of the offense for which the arrest is being made. 44
The first half of Gant’s approach is in line with Chimel. If the
arrestee has access to the car at the time the search is performed,
then it is reasonable to assume that the arrestee might attempt to
access a weapon (endangering the officers), or access some other
evidence (so he can destroy it). The second justification provided in
Gant—requiring reasonable suspicion that evidence will be found
relating to the crime even when the arrestee does not have access to
the car—is also in agreement with Chimel. Because Chimel is
concerned with lost evidence, it follows that if the police do not
reasonably believe that there is evidence in the car, then there is no
reason to allow a search; there is likely no evidence that can later be
moved or destroyed. 45 This approach only allows an evidentiary
search and not a search specifically for weapons. If the arrestee does
not have access to the car, then it is unlikely that he will be able to
retrieve a weapon from the car and attack the officers conducting the
search.
Even when police do not immediately search a car incident-toarrest, they may search the car later at the police station. 46 This
rationale might fit into the safety reasoning in Chimel. It might not be
safe to search a car at the location where the police arrest the driver
and take possession of the car. So, although it strains Chimel, officer
safety arguably requires the car to be searched at a later time and a
safer location. However, the dissent in Chambers v. Maroney—

43. Id.
44. Id. at 351.
45. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (explaining that a car may be
searched without a warrant because a car is movable, and the contents might not be found if the
police have to wait for a warrant. Even if the police have the driver in custody, a friend could
come and drive away with the car and the evidence).
46. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970) (explaining that there is “little to
choose in terms of practical consequences between an immediate search without a warrant and
the car’s immobilization until a warrant is obtained”).
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unwilling to extend Chimel so far—points out that the facts that
justify the search of the car will also usually justify the arrest of the
driver. 47 If that is the case then the arrestee will suffer no further
inconvenience if the police also detain his car while waiting for a
search warrant. 48 Certainly, a warrantless search is a far greater
intrusion than a temporary seizure. 49
We can see that the Court’s reasoning may be overreaching when
we consider how the Court has applied this same type of logic to
luggage, but comes to the opposite conclusion. 50 The Court
reasoned that once the police have exclusive control of luggage and
“there is no longer any danger that the arrestee might gain access to
the property to seize a weapon or destroy evidence, a search of that
property is no longer an incident of the arrest.” 51 Perhaps the
contradictory reasoning in the two decisions stems from the personal
nature of luggage as compared to the less personal nature of cars.
After all, the contents of luggage are not usually visible to the
outside observer, and luggage often contains personal items such as
toiletries, clothes, work product, and personal photos. The contents
of cars are visible to the outside observer through the windows, and
cars do not as often contain the personal items that luggage does. 52
When transporting luggage in a car, luggage loses its protection.
Because an officer can conduct a warrantless search of a car (and any
containers in the car that can hold the object of the search), an officer
can also search a car when his probable cause extends only to the
container itself.53 So, if the police have probable cause to search your
luggage, and you put your luggage in a car, the officer can search the
luggage without obtaining a warrant. Consequently, in jurisdictions that
compare cell phones to luggage or similar closed containers, when an
officer wants to search your cell phone and you are in a car, the law
often does little to protect the privacy of your cell phone.
47. Id. at 63–64 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
48. Id. at 64 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
49. If the driver is arrested, a search incident-to-arrest usually takes place, which would
then fall under Gant.
50. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977) (citing Preston v. United States,
376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964)) (“[W]arrantless searches of luggage or other property seized at the
time of an arrest cannot be justified as incident to that arrest either if the ‘search is remote in
time or place from the arrest,’ or no exigency exists.”).
51. Id.
52. See id. at 12.
53. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991).
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III. JURISDICTIONS DIVIDED: WARRANTLESS CELL PHONE SEARCHES
INCIDENT-TO-ARREST
Most courts find that a person has a reasonable expectation of
privacy in their cell phone. However, when it comes to the legality of
a warrantless government search of a cell phone incident-to-arrest,
the courts are divided. Even among the jurisdictions that generally
find that police need to obtain a warrant to search a cell phone, these
jurisdictions often still outline a certain number of exceptions that
would allow warrantless searches.

A. A Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in Cell Phones
If warrantless cell phone searches incident-to-arrest were judged
solely on the basis of the Katz test, cell phones would likely receive a
great deal of protection. Under the Katz test, most courts have found
that individuals maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy with
respect to their cell phones, and that this expectation is one that
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.
Courts have even found a reasonable expectation of privacy in
employer-issued cell phones. In United States v. Finley, government
agents warrantlessly searched a defendant’s company-issued cell phone,
finding evidence of drug trafficking in text messages on the cell
phone.54 The Fifth Circuit held that although the defendant’s employer
could read the text messages once the phone was returned to the
employer, the defendant had a reasonable expectation to be free from
intrusion from the government and the general public. 55 When people
have cell phones for their personal use, they expect the use to be just
that—personal. 56 Cell phone users may use text-messaging, email, or
instant messaging from their cell phones so that people nearby cannot
hear an otherwise audible conversation. One court noted that it is
reasonable for a person to expect privacy in information contained in a
cell phone, especially when much of information contained on a cell
phone is not even available to the service provider.57
54. United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 254 (5th Cir. 2007).
55. Id. at 259.
56. One court even stated that “it seems indisputable that a person has a subjective
expectation of privacy in the contents of his or her cell phone.” United States v. Wurie, 612 F.
Supp. 2d 104, 109 (D. Mass. 2009), rev’d, No. 11-1792, 2013 WL 2129119, at *12 (1st Cir. May
17, 2013).
57. United States v. James, No. 1:06CR134 CDP, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34864, at *10
(E.D. Mo. Apr. 29, 2008).
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Privacy in a person’s cell phone is also an expectation that
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. One court analogized
text messages to traditional mail and email. 58 The court reasoned
that because individuals maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the contents of traditional mail and in the contents of email, then
text messages should be no different. 59 Society recognizes personal
communications as private and maintains that expectation as
technology advances. Like the telephone booth in 1967, today the
cell phone plays a vital role in private communication. In fact,
because of the way cell phones are used, and the information stored
on them (like the pictures in the opening example), cell phones have
become even more vital to private communication today than
telephone booths were in 1967. If courts read the Constitution so
narrowly as to protect communications on a cell phone only when
they are made by a traditional voice call, and not when sent by digital
message or Internet use, courts would be “ignor[ing] the vital role”
cell phones have “come to play in private communication.” 60
Therefore, if Katz were the only standard to judge cell phone
searches, police would almost always have to get a warrant.
However, in reality, cell phones usually lose their protection in the
tangled mass of exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant
requirement.

B. Cell Phones Not Protected Incident-to-Arrest
Even though cell phone users have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in their cell phones, courts have used the search incident-toarrest exception as a loophole that has rendered cell phones
essentially unprotected. Most often, courts analogize cell phones to
closed containers, like the cigarette package in Robinson, allowing the
search incident-to-arrest.61 Some courts take it a step further,
categorizing cell phones as personal property associated with the
arrestee’s person, expanding both the time and the place of the cell
phone search incident-to-arrest. 62 Other courts allow warrantless

58. Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 905 (9th Cir. 2008), rev’d on

other grounds sub nom, City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010).
59. Id.
60. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967).
61. See, e.g., United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250 (5th Cir. 2007).
62. See, e.g., People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501 (Cal. 2011).
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cell phone searches because it is difficult to ascertain an individual
cell phone’s memory capability, and these courts fear that delay
would result in a loss of valuable evidence. 63 Finally, some courts
rely on Gant-style reasoning to allow warrantless cell phone searches,
especially in the context of illegal drug arrests. 64

1. The Finley closed container test
In United States v. Finley, supra, the defendant tried to get the
evidence found on his cell phone thrown out by arguing that because
a cell phone is analogous to a closed container, the police could not
search the phone’s contents without a warrant. 65 The defendant
relied on Walter v. United States, a case in which the search did not
occur incident-to-arrest. 66 The Finley court explained that the Walter
facts contained no evidence of an applicable exception to the warrant
requirement. 67 The court further explained that the “permissible
scope of a search incident to a lawful arrest extends to containers
found on the arrestee’s person.” 68 The court further cited a case that
allowed the search of a pager incident-to-arrest. 69 It seems the court
found a pager sufficiently analogous to a cell phone to allow the
search.
According to the Finley decision, when no currently recognized
exception to the warrant requirement applies, cell phones are
protected. However, when there is a warrant exception like search
incident-to-arrest, police can freely search cell phones, despite the
reasonable expectation of privacy. With the amount of information
available on cell phones, such a ruling requires cell phone users to
leave their cell phones at home (defeating the purpose of a cell
phone), avoid arrest, or be prepared to open up their whole lives to
the police. As long the police have a legitimate reason for arrest,

63. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 278 F. App’x. 242 (4th Cir. 2008).
64. See, e.g., United States v. Quintana, 594 F. Supp. 2d 1291 (M.D. Fla. 2008).
65. Finley, 477 F.3d at 260.
66. Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649 (1980). In Walter, the Supreme Court ruled
unconstitutional a search where federal agents opened and searched a closed package delivered
to the wrong address. Id. at 655.
67. Finley, 477 F.3d at 260.
68. Id.
69. Id. (citing United States v. Ortiz, 84 F.3d 977, 984 (7th Cir. 1996), which held that a
pager is sufficiently analogous to a closed container to justify the search incident-to-arrest.).
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even a pre-textual reason, 70 they can search your cell phone 71 with
all of your private information. 72

2. Cell phones as personal property associated with the arrestee’s person
Other courts have built on Finley, further distinguishing the
closed container argument by categorizing cell phones as personal
property associated with the arrestee’s person. Such a categorization
broadens police authority to search cell phones incident-to-arrest. In
People v. Diaz, the California Supreme Court distinguished and
categorized cell phones as personal property associated with the
arrestee’s person (analogous to the cigarette package in Robinson, or
the clothes in Edwards), rather than an item merely in the area of the
arrestee’s immediate control (more like the luggage in Chadwick). 73
The U.S. Northern District of California also made this same
distinction in United States v. Hill, finding a cell phone to be an
element of a person’s clothing. 74 Because these courts found cell
phones to be personal property associated with the arrestee’s person,
they allowed cell phone searches as incident-to-arrest, even when the
search was remote in time or place. 75
The Diaz court rejected the argument that because a cell phone
can contain “quantities of personal data unrivaled by any
conventional item of evidence traditionally considered to be
‘immediately associated with the person of the arrestee,’” it should
be exempt from search incident-to-arrest.76 The Diaz court
explained that the Supreme Court had previously rejected “the view

70. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (“Subjective intentions play no
role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”).
71. Generally, even locking your cell phone does not guarantee protection from a
warrantless search. See, e.g., Gershowitz, supra note 7.
72. Several other courts have followed Finley without taking much time to discuss the
issue, apparently simply agreeing with the Finley holding. See, e.g., Silvan W. v. Briggs, 309 F.
App’x. 216 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Salgado, No. 1:09-CR-454-CAP-ECS-5, 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 77266 (N.D. Ga. June 15, 2010); United States v. Deans, 549 F. Supp. 2d 1085 (D.
Minn. 2008).
73. People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 505 (Cal. 2011).
74. United States v. Hill, No. CR 10-00261 JSW, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4104, at *21
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2011).
75. Diaz, 244 P.3d at 505 (explaining that a “delayed warrantless search was a valid
search incident to defendant’s lawful custodial arrest” because the cell phone was personal
property immediately associated with the defendant’s person).
76. Id. at 506.
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that the validity of a warrantless search depends on the character of
the searched item.” 77 The court then went on to argue that making a
rule based on the amount of information an item can hold is
problematic, stating that it would be difficult for other courts to
determine whether a particular item has enough storage space to
warrant constitutional protection. 78 The court ultimately concluded
that even if a cell phone is not a “container,” the real question is
whether a cell phone is “property,” and that because a cell phone is
“property” it is searchable incident-to-arrest. 79
Other courts have followed suit, comparing cell phones to other
items that have very little in common with cell phones. In United
States v. Wurie, the U.S. District of Massachusetts compared the
information in a cell phone to a wallet, an arrestee’s pockets, handheld luggage, and a purse. 80 In United States v. Gomez, the U.S.
Southern District of Florida analogized a cell phone to a wallet,
purse, briefcase, backpack or personal bag, address book or
organizer, home closet, a person’s groin area, and even a person’s
bicycle handlebar.81

3. The unknown memory exception
Other courts avoid the property distinction. At least one court
has found that due to the unknown memory capabilities, exigent
circumstances allowed the warrantless search. In 2008, the Fourth
Circuit argued that because the police have “no way of knowing
whether . . . text messages would automatically delete themselves
or be preserved,” they may search a phone incident-to-arrest to
preserve evidence. 82 In 2009, the Fourth Circuit reaffirmed this
analysis, and refused to distinguish between smartphones and other
cell phones, saying it is unlikely that a policeman would be able
judge the memory capacity of a cell phone by merely looking at it. 83

77. Id. at 507 (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982)).
78. Id. at 508.
79. Id. at 510.
80. United States v. Wurie, 612 F. Supp. 2d 104, 110 (D. Mass. 2009) rev’d, No. 11-1792,
2013 WL 2129119, at *12 (1st Cir. May 17, 2013).
81. United States v. Gomez, 807 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1144 (S.D. Fla. 2011).
82. United States v. Young, 278 F. App’x 242, 245 (4th Cir. 2008).
83. United States v. Murphy, 552 F.3d 405, 411 (4th Cir. 2009).
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4. Gant-style reasoning and the illegal drug test
Other courts have used the automobile exception reasoning to
justify warrantless searches of cell phones. Courts in this category do
not necessarily allow across-the-board cell phone searches incidentto-arrest, but they do allow broad enough searches that I have
included this category with courts that generally allow warrantless
cell phone searches.
In United States v. Fierros-Alavarez, during a routine inventory
search, the police discovered a hidden compartment in the car that
contained drugs. 84 The police then seized the defendant’s cell phone,
believing the cell phone was used to facilitate drug distribution, and
performed a warrantless search. 85 The Fierros-Alavarez court
concluded the search was permissible because the phone was in the
car, and because cell phones are “recognized tools of the drugdealing trade.” 86 In United States v. James, the U.S. Eastern District of
Missouri cited Fierros-Alavarez explaining that “[b]ecause probable
cause existed to believe that evidence of a crime would be found in
the cell phone call records and address book, the automobile
exception allows the search of the cell phone just as it allows a
search of other closed containers found in vehicles.” 87 Both courts
compared cell phones to containers, which left the door open for
more invasive searches based on the search incident-to-arrest
exception. 88 In United States v. Quintana, the U.S. Middle District of
Florida used the reasoning in James and expressly allowed police to
search a cell phone incident-to-arrest.89 The reasoning in these
decisions is reminiscent of Gant, even though all three decisions
were decided a year before Gant. 90
84. United States v. Fierros-Alavarez, 547 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1208 (D. Kan. 2008).
85. Id. at 1212.
86. Id. (citing United States v. Lazcano-Villalobos, 175 F.3d 838, 844 (10th Cir. 1999)).
87. United States v. James, No. 1:06CR134 CDP, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34864, at *10–11
(E.D. Mo. Apr. 29, 2008).
88. The James court noted in dicta that search incident-to-arrest does not justify cell
phone searches. Id. at *27 n.4. But, this language was simply dicta, and other courts have used
the reasoning in James to justify cell phone searches incident-to-arrest.
89. United States v. Quintana, 594 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1299 (M.D. Fla. 2009). However,
the court suppressed the evidence from the cell phone because searching a cell phone incidentto-arrest to “preserve evidence is permissible only to secure evidence of the crime of arrest, not
evidence of an unrelated crime.” Id. at 1300.
90. It is interesting to note that in Quintana, the court recognized that Gant would soon
be decided and actually quoted some of the oral argument from Gant. Id.
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C. Warrantless Cell Phone Searches Generally Prohibited
A few courts do not allow search incident-to-arrest of cell
phones. However, even among the courts that protect cell phones
from warrantless searches, some exceptions still apply. In addition,
there is disagreement among these courts regarding the rationale for
prohibiting warrantless searches of cell phones. First, courts have
found that cell phones are not personal property associated with the
arrestee’s person, but instead are possessions within the immediate
control of the arrestee. 91 Other courts have refused to compare cell
phones to containers at all, reasoning that a container must be able
to contain another physical object.92 Finally, some courts allow very
limited cell phone searches incident-to-arrest, requiring a warrant for
broader searches. 93

1. Cell phones as possessions within the immediate control of the arrestee
One of the most important cases disallowing warrantless
searches of cell phones is United States v. Park. In Park, the police
officers arrested the defendant, later seizing his phone. 94 While
there is some confusion as to whether the phone was searched
before or after booking, the phone was not searched until sometime
after the arrest. 95 The U.S. Northern District of California disagreed
with Finley’s analysis and distinguished Park.96 It found that
“cellular phones should be considered ‘possessions within an
arrestee’s immediate control’ and not part of ‘the person.’” 97 The
court reasoned that this was because cell phones have “the capacity
for storing immense amounts of private information.” 98 Then the
court distinguished cell phones from items such as address books
and pagers, noting that unlike address books and pagers, cell phones
can contain incoming and outgoing call records, address books,

91. See, e.g., United States v. Park, No. CR 05-375 SI, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40596 (N.D.
Cal. May 23, 2007).
92. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949 (Ohio 2009).
93. See, e.g., United States v. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d 803, 806 (7th Cir. 2012).
94. Park, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40596, at *4–5.
95. Id. at *10–11.
96. Id. at *21.
97. Id. (citing United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 16 n.10 (1977)).
98. Id. at *21.
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calendar, email, video, pictures, and voice and text messages. 99 The
court also found it important that “[i]ndividuals can store highly
personal information on their cell phones, and can record their most
private thoughts and conversations on their cell phones through
email and text, voice and instant messages.” 100
Further, the court found that the search strayed from the original
justifications in Chimel (safety and preventing destruction of
evidence), 101 and that instead the search was purely investigatory. 102
The court did not consider cell phones sufficiently analogous to
pagers to allow the search in order to prevent the destruction of
evidence. 103 The court indicated that cell phone memories are
different from pager memories, and that cell phones are not as
susceptible to memory loss as are pagers. 104 The court also rejected
the argument that a search of the cell phone was necessary for a
routine booking search. 105 Because the purpose behind booking
searches is to create an inventory of the arrestee’s possessions, it is
sufficient merely to list the cell phone on the booking form. 106

2. Cell phones as a computer
Some courts analogize cell phones to computers, recognizing
that they contain digital information. 107 In State v. Smith, the Ohio
Supreme Court rejected the argument that a cell phone is analogous
to a closed container, and held that a warrantless search incident-toarrest of cell phones is unconstitutional because such a search is
99. Id. at *21–22.
100. Id. at *21.
101. See United States v. McGhee, No. 8:09CR31, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62427, at *2 (D.
Neb. July 21, 2009) (holding a warrantless cell phone search unconstitutional because, “[I]t was
not reasonable for the officer to believe that [the] cell phone . . . would have information
relating to crimes.” And, “[T]he phone did not present a risk of harm to officers or appear to be
contraband or destructible evidence.”).
102. Park, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40596, at *24.
103. See id. at *27.
104. See id.
105. Id. at *30–31.
106. Id. at *32.
107. United States v. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d 803, 804 (7th Cir. 2012) (explaining that “a
modern cell phone is a computer”). Although the Flores-Lopez court goes on to find, mostly in
dicta, that a cell phone could be searched incident-to-arrest, the point is still valid that courts
compare cell phones to computers. The fact that a court could state that a cell phone is a
computer and still allow it to be searched without a warrant shows how important it is that the
Supreme Court weighs in on the debate.
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unnecessary to ensure the safety of officers or prevent the
destruction of evidence. 108 In rejecting the closed container
argument the court argued that the “Supreme Court has stated that
in this situation, ‘container’ means ‘any object capable of holding
another object.’” 109 The Smith court concluded that this definition
means that a container must hold another physical object, and digital
data is not a physical object. 110 The Smith court agreed with the
analysis in Park that the immense amount of capacity for personal
data available on cell phones heightens the privacy interest in cell
phones. 111 The court also declined to create a rule that would
require officers to discern the memory capabilities on a cell phone
before searching a phone incident-to-arrest. 112 Instead, the court
required a warrant because “[o]nce the cell phone is in police
custody, the state has satisfied its immediate interest in collecting
and preserving evidence and can take preventive steps to ensure that
the data found on the phone are neither lost nor erased.” 113
More recently, in Schlossberg v. Solesbee, the U.S. District Court of
Oregon found the reasoning in Park and Smith to be persuasive and
followed those cases. The Schlossberg court found the classification of
cell phones as containers problematic:
Consideration of an electronic device as a “container” is
problematic. Electronic devices do not store physical objects which
are in plain view once the containers are opened. Moreover, the
storage capability of an electronic device is not limited by physical
size as a container is. In order to carry the same amount of personal
information contained in many of today’s electronic devices in a
container, a citizen would have to travel with one or more large
suitcases, if not file cabinets. 114

The court’s characterization may seem heavy-handed, but it is
probably not far off the mark. For example, “[a] cell phone with just
one gigabyte of memory can store over 64,000 pages of Microsoft
Word text, or over 100,000 pages of e-mails, or over 675,000 pages
108. State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 955 (Ohio 2009).
109. Id. at 954 (citing New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 n.4 (1981)).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 955 (rejecting analysis that finds modern cell phones to be analogous to address
books and pagers).
112. Id. at 954.
113. Id. at 955.
114. Schlossberg v. Solesbee, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1169 (D. Or. 2012).
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of text files.” 115 Thus, considering that the iPhone 5 is offered with
memory capabilities of 16 gigabytes, 32 gigabytes, and 64
gigabytes,116 it is hard to imagine how many suitcases or filing
cabinets would contain the equivalent amount of information.
Another court observed that:
An iPhone application called iCam allows you to access your home
computer’s webcam so that you can survey the inside of your home
while you’re a thousand miles away. At the touch of a button a cell
phone search becomes a house search, and that is not a search of a
“container” in any normal sense of that word, though a house
contains data. 117

The scope of a cell phone search can expand dramatically and
easily at the touch of a screen. 118 Indeed, it seems everything really
has an “app for that.” With so many applications and immense
storage capacities on cell phones, our personal lives are increasingly
being stored on our phones. The Schlossberg court went on to reject
the reasoning in Finley, saying that “any citizen committing even the
most minor arrestable offense is at risk of having his or her most
intimate information viewed by an arresting officer.” 119

3. The trivial information test
Some courts generally require a warrant for cell phone searches,
except for specific exceptions. First, some courts have allowed police
to search cell phone address books and call lists incident-to-arrest,
but require a warrant for more invasive searches. In Quon v. Arch
Wireless, the court compared text messages and email to traditional
letters.120 The court protected the content of text messages and

115. MacLean, supra note 8, at 41.
116. iPhone, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/iphone/compare/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2013 ).
117. United States v. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d 803, 806 (7th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).
118. An entire home can be monitored and controlled from a cell phone. Best Buy offers a
service, controlled through a laptop or a cell phone, that allows the user to “monitor your entire
house and control your lights and appliances. . . . Check to make sure your doors are locked
securely. If you notice the temperature changing back at home, adjust your thermostat
accordingly.” Monitor and Control Your Home While You’re on Vacation, BEST BUY,
http://www.bestbuy.com/site/Appliances-Promotions/Control-Your-Home-FromAnywhere/pcmcat253800050004.c?id=pcmcat253800050004 (last visited Oct. 21, 2013).
119. Schlossberg, 844 F. Supp. 2d at 1169.
120. Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co. 529 F.3d 892, 905 (9th Cir. 2008), rev’d on other
grounds sub nom. City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010).
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emails found on cell phones, but not the addressing information
(phone number, email address) used to address the email or text
message. 121 The Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Flores-Lopez,
arrived at a similar result. The Flores-Lopez court allowed police to
search a cell phone for its phone number, calling that information
“trivial.” 122 However, according to the Seventh Circuit, other
information, such as the content of text messages, might be
protected because it is similar to a traditional letter. 123 The court
went on to speculate in dicta that a more thorough search of a cell
phone might be possible to prevent destruction of evidence, but
expressly refused to make a holding to that effect. 124
IV. CELL PHONES AS A “SECOND MIND”: A CASE FOR INCREASED
PROTECTION OF CELL PHONES
The majority of courts in this country allow search incident-toarrest of cell phones based on inapt comparisons and resulting in
significant violations of privacy. This policy can easily lead to police
conducting searches that open up almost every aspect of the
suspect’s life, even if the arresting officer has no particular reason to
believe that he will find destructible evidence on the phone. Those
courts that do not allow police to search cell phones incident-toarrest provide protection that is either too narrow in scope, does not
give workable guidelines, or, in the alternative, allows unacceptable
exceptions. All courts fail to recognize what role cell phones have
come to play in our society and what cell phones mean to the
individuals who use them. The amount of information that cell
phones contain, and the associated privacy expectation, essentially
renders cell phones a person’s second mind. 125

121. Id.
122. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d at 806–07.
123. Id. at 807.
124. Id. at 808–10. However, the court rejected the argument that lost data could be
recovered in a lab because this would involve delay. Id. at 808.
125. Gershowitz argues that it does not make sense to argue that a phone cannot be
associated with the person of an arrestee. Gershowitz, supra note 7, at 1160–61. Gershowitz
states that “[i]t is difficult to comprehend how a cell phone that is literally attached to an
arrestee’s arm could not be associated with the person of an arrestee.” Id. Gershowitz is right;
cell phones are associated with the person of the arrestee. But, cell phones are associated with
the person of the arrestee in a much more intimate way than Gershowitz envisions.
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First, it is important to determine what cell phones are not. One
of the most significant analytical mistakes courts make is comparing
cell phones to containers. On the surface, comparing cell phones to
traditional containers might make sense. It has been argued that cell
phones contain information similar to information found in other,
more traditional containers. 126 As mentioned above, 127 cell phones
do not fit the category of traditional containers, or even come close
to fitting the definition of containers as put forth by the Supreme
Court in Belton.128 Cell phones do not contain physical items, 129 and
if they can be said to contain anything it is digital information. One
author noted that:
[C]ell phones have a larger memory to store numbers and call logs,
which seems to be the object of most of the police searches. But,
with this increased memory, cell phones have greater capacity to
store information, such as address books, pictures, and emails.
These differences should make other courts take a hard look at the
validity of the analogy or whether to apply the “container rule,” at
all, to cell phones. 130

Even when courts do not compare cell phones to containers, the
need to preserve evidence may still apply to cell phones. 131 However,
while it is generally true that some destructible evidence may be at
risk, police officers can take steps to safeguard against this
destruction without a warrantless search, as will be shown below.
The Supreme Court has always strongly protected the privacy of
the home, and as noted above, a cell phone search can quickly
become a home search by the touch of a screen. 132 We now have the
ability to carry our homes with us in our pockets. However, cell

126. Byron Kish, Comment, Cellphone Searches: Works like a Computer, Protected like a Pager?,
60 CATH. U. L. REV. 445, 466–67 (2011).
127. Supra notes 107–115 and accompanying text.
128. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460, n.4 (1981) (defining an open container as
“any object capable of holding another object”).
129. One author noted, “Cell phones may very well be—and often are—within their
owner’s immediate reach, but they do not contain any of the objects that provide the basis for
this justification,” referring to Chimel justifications (safety and preventing the destruction of
evidence). Bryan A. Stillwagon, Note, Bringing an End to Warrantless Cell Phone Searches, 42 GA. L.
REV. 1165, 1195 (2008).
130. J. Patrick Warfield, Note, Putting a Square Peg in a Round Hold: The Search-Incident-toArrest Exception and Cellular Phones, 34 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 165, 185 (2010).
131. Kish, supra note 126.
132. Supra note 115 and accompanying text.
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phones have the capacity to store far more than address books,
pictures, and emails. Cell phones have become the organizer and
depository of our lives. In some ways, the information kept on cell
phones may be more private than that which we keep in our in our
homes. Our cell phones have become a part of us in a much more
intimate way than was envisioned by courts that categorize cell
phones as personal property associated with the arrestee’s person.
When the Diaz court rejected the argument that the amount of
data on a cell phone should preclude search incident-to-arrest, the
court argued that the Supreme Court stated that the character of the
searched item does not matter when determining the validity of the
search. 133 However, the court failed to recognize that because of the
character of cell phones and the ability of cell phones to contain vast
amounts of personal information has changed, the expectation of
privacy has changed as well. It is not the character of the item that
matters so much as the expectation of privacy. In the example that
opened this paper, the pictures that got Nick in trouble were neither
illegal nor something he would display in his home. They were
personal, intimate pictures that he carried with him away from
prying eyes. Before cell phones, people would not likely carry such
pictures with them, or even keep them easily accessible within the
home. More than likely, information this private would simply be a
happy memory that you carried around in your mind. In this way,
the information on cell phones can sometimes be more private than
information in the home.
Comparing cell phones to other objects a person might carry
with them is also problematic. Privacy interests in almost any object
from previous case law are not comparable to the privacy interests
present in cell phones. A wallet contains personal information, but
not on the scale of what is in a cell phone. 134 The dissent in Smith
would have found a cell phone search constitutional because the
police merely searched the phone’s address book. 135 Comparing an

133. People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 507 (Cal. 2011).
134. One article argues that information contained in a wallet contains a wealth of
information, including where an arrestee banks, shops, medical conditions, pictures of children,
and other more scandalous information. Gershowitz, supra note 7, at 1160. However, while this
is a large amount of information, it pales in comparison to the amount of digital information
that can be stored in cell phones.
135. State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 957 (Ohio 2009) (Cupp, J., dissenting).
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address book to a cell phone demonstrates a fundamental
misunderstanding of the capabilities of cell phones.
While the Smith dissent is correct that other courts have upheld
searches of a traditional address book incident-to-arrest, 136 it fails to
recognize that to search a traditional address book police need
merely search the book itself. Even though cell phones have address
books, they contain so much more, and allowing police to simply
search a cell phone address book is problematic. A police officer
would have to search the cell phone to even find the address
book. 137 While conducting such a search, the police officer may
inadvertently stumble across other information that requires a
warrant. 138 Similarly, it is troublesome to allow searches of call logs
simply because this information could also be obtained from the
phone company.139 Even if it is possible to subpoena a third party to
obtain information, that does not make it proper to cut out the
middleman and perform an unconstitutional search. 140
Trying to compare a message or other communication on a
phone to a traditional letter is also misleading. Similar to searching a
cell phone’s call log, protecting the substance of a communication
while allowing police to search for the “addressing” information
creates problems. One journal article notes this inconsistency and
demonstrates it with an analogy:
Imagine that you send a letter to a friend. Nothing stops law
enforcement from observing the information on the outside of the
envelope while the letter is in the custody of the postal service.
However, if law enforcement does not obtain that information
while the letter is in transit, the opportunity is lost. Once the letter

136. Id.
137. It does not matter that such a search may be cursory, a search is a search. Arizona v.
Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987).
138. For example, if a warrantless search really did become a home search at the touch of a
button it would be difficult to see how a court could justify such an invasion. See, e.g., supra note
115 and accompanying text.
139. See MacLean, supra note 8, at 42 (explaining that “[a] cell phone owner has both
objective and subjective reasonable expectations of privacy in the content of text messages and
other data stored in the cell phone’s internal memory, at least where those data are not also
maintained long-term by a third party cell service provider”).
140. Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 905 (9th Cir. 2008) (explaining
that simply because the service provider had access to the contents of the subscriber’s messages
is irrelevant. A person still does not lose his or her expectation of privacy.), rev’d on other grounds
sub nom. City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010).
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reaches a person’s mailbox, or at least the inside of his home, it has
entered a location in which an owner has a reasonable expectation
of privacy. Similarly, once the information sent from a cellular
phone is no longer in transit, it is no longer obtainable by a pen
register. Therefore, the incoming and outgoing phone numbers
stored in recent call lists are like the letter that has already been
delivered—they are now in a protected area. 141

Once the message is in the phone, just as when a letter is in a
home, the message is no longer in the public space. Justice Scalia
once noted in a related context that “[t]he fact that equivalent
information could sometimes be obtained by other means does not
make lawful the use of means that violate the Fourth
Amendment.” 142
Because of the amount of information available on a cell phone,
cell phones should have a heightened expectation of privacy, which
may be even greater than the expectation of privacy attached to the
home. Therefore, all details on a phone are private (or intimate)
details, and as such should be safe from a warrantless search. 143 This
heightened expectation of privacy for cell phones renders the
attempts of courts to distinguish between personal property
associated with the arrestee’s person and items merely within their
control meaningless. Cell phones are associated with an individual’s
person, but they have become so much more than that. Cell phones
have become “virtual extensions of ourselves, holding our contacts,
text messages, voicemail, e-mail, documents, Facebook feeds,
location data, pictures and more.” 144 These are the personal,
intimate details of our lives, even the details of our minds. Like Nick
at the beginning of this paper, we often carry personal details on our
phones that most people would not carry around any other way—in
order to keep private things private.

141. Matthew E. Orso, Cellular Phones, Warrantless Searches, and the New Frontier of Fourth
Amendment Jurisprudence, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 183, 190–91 (2010).
142. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 35 n.2 (2001).
143. Id. at 37.
144. David Kravets, Lawsuit Challenges Warrantless Searches of Arrestees’ Cellphones, WIRED
(Mar. 20, 2013, 2:56 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/03/warrantless-cell-search/.
This article reports that the American Civil Liberties Union is suing the San Francisco Police
Department, claiming that a warrantless search of an arrestee’s cell phone breaches the First
Amendment rights of the arrestee and the First Amendment rights of the arrestee’s phone
contacts, text messages, and Facebook friends. Id. While First Amendment rights may indeed be
implicated, that is outside the scope of this paper.
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While cell phones function as a person’s second mind, there are
obvious differences between a cell phone and the human mind. Most
importantly, the human mind is not searchable like a cell phone.
However, if the police could search, or read, a person’s mind using
advanced technology, it is hard to see how a court could justify such
a search absent a warrant. The mere fact that a cell phone is
searchable does not diminish the expectation of privacy bestowed on
the information saved in the memory of a cell phone. A cell phone’s
searchability only increases its value as the second mind. Now
people can easily remember and look up data that in years past they
would easily forget. Cell phones as a second mind function as a way
for people to read their own thoughts and more easily access their
own memories. Simply because the details of a person’s thoughts are
recorded digitally, and are more easily accessible, does not make
those thoughts any less private. Traditionally the Supreme Court has
afforded the home the highest possible protection. 145 A person’s
mind is the only truly secret place. In our minds, we have thoughts
that we never share with anyone. However, now that it is possible to
“read” a person’s mind by searching their cell phone, the second
mind should be given high protection at least as strong as the
protection given to the home.
The existing jurisprudence on searches incident-to-arrest of cell
phones fails to understand what cell phones have become in our
modern society. Courts often fail to give workable guidelines for
when warrantless searches might be appropriate. Sometimes a
court’s holding is too narrow and fails to consider the future changes
in the field of electronic communications. Any solution that fails to
consider future technological advances would constitute merely a
stopgap solution. Other times courts still leave open the possibility
of exceptions to the rule that give police too much leeway to perform
warrantless cell phone searches. Cell phones have become so
associated with an individual that cell phones have essentially
become a second mind with an attendant heightened expectation of
privacy. If people can no longer control the privacy of their own
minds, the term privacy is rendered meaningless.

145. See, e.g., Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37 (“In the home, our cases show, all details are intimate
details, because the entire area is held safe from prying government eyes.”).
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V. BRINGING CELL PHONE SEARCHES IN LINE WITH THE CONSTITUTION:
TWO POSSIBILITIES
By prohibiting warrantless searches, the Constitution is simply
protecting our privacy. The Supreme Court once stated:
Absent some grave emergency, the Fourth Amendment has
interposed a magistrate between the citizen and the police. This
was done not to shield criminals nor to make the home a safe haven
for illegal activities. It was done so that an objective mind might
weigh the need to invade that privacy in order to enforce the
law. 146

Innocent people can have their rights violated as well as guilty
people. A warrantless search can be just as destructive for an
innocent person as for a criminal.
With cell phones containing as much information as they do and
the attendant heightened expectation, the point first made by Judge
Learned Hand, and subsequently by the Chimel court, applies equally
well to cell phones:
After arresting a man in his house, to rummage at will among his
papers in search of whatever will convict him, appears to us to be
indistinguishable from what might be done under a general
warrant; indeed, the warrant would give more protection, for
presumably it must be issued by a magistrate. True, by hypothesis
the power would not exist, if the supposed offender were not found
on the premises; but it is small consolation to know that one’s
papers are safe only so long as one is not at home. 147

It is a small consolation to know that your cell phone is safe so long
as you leave it at home.
It would be a mistake to allow search incident-to-arrest of cell
phones simply because the majority of courts allow it. The Supreme
Court said in Gant that “[w]e have never relied on stare decisis to
justify the continuance of an unconstitutional police practice. And
we would be particularly loath to uphold an unconstitutional result
in a case that is so easily distinguished from the decisions that

146. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948).
147. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 767–68 (1969) (citing United States v.
Kirschenblatt, 16 F.2d 202, 203 (2d Cir. 1926)).
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arguably compel it.” 148 Cell phones are easily distinguished from
other property a person may carry with them.
It is time for the Supreme Court to take up this question and
resolve the confusion among the appellate circuits. The following
discussion presents two possible options that the Supreme Court
could take to stabilize the law regarding searches of cell phones.
These options have been tailored to fit alongside current Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, but also recognize the special nature and
heightened expectation of privacy associated with cell phones. First,
the Court could rest on Gant-style reasoning and allow cell phones to
be searched incident-to-arrest only if there is probable cause to
believe the cell phone contains information related to the crime of
arrest. Second, the Court could find that cell phones require
heightened protection of privacy and hold that cell phone searches
do not fall within the exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant
requirement.

A. A Gant-based Solution
To resolve the dilemma posed by warrantless searches of cell
phones incident-to-arrest, the Supreme Court can look to its
precedent in Arizona v. Gant. 149 In Gant the court noted, “[i]f there is
no possibility that an arrestee could reach into the area that law
enforcement officers seek to search, both justifications for the
search-incident-to-arrest exception are absent and the rule does not
apply.” 150 Once the police have possession of an arrestee’s cell
phone, the arrestee can no longer delete incriminating information.
Therefore, search incident-to-arrest would no longer apply and the
search would be unlawful.
If the Supreme Court adopted Gant’s reasoning, then police
could only search a cell phone for information related to the crime of
arrest. This solution is particularly appealing because it would allow
police to perform some searches without going through the effort of
obtaining a search warrant, while prohibiting most cell phone

148. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 348 (2009).
149. The Supreme Court can also look to the precedent set by United States v. FierrosAlavarez, 547 F. Supp. 2d 1206 (D. Kan. 2008), United States v. Quintana, 594 F. Supp. 2d 1291
(M.D. Fla. 2009), and United States v. James, No. 1:06CR134 CDP, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34864
(E.D. Mo. Apr. 29, 2008).
150. Gant, 556 U.S. at 339.

1389

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2/6/2014 11:15 AM

2013

searches.151 For example, during an arrest for a drug crime “it would
make sense to search . . . text messages for further evidence of the
crime, since that function is commonly used in conjunction with
drug sales.” 152 However, in this situation it would be unreasonable
for police to search photo albums or Internet history “because such
applications likely have nothing to do with drug sales.” 153 Adopting
the Gant rule for cell phones “would prevent police from roaming at
large among the thousands of pages of data held” in a cell phone. 154
One objection to this approach is that such a search would be a
mere evidence gathering expedition, based only on suspicion and not
probable cause. 155 Another objection is that the rationale that allows
automobile searches is mostly absent when it comes to cell phones.
One journal article stated the automobile exception rationale this
way:
The rationale is twofold. First, automobiles are mobile and
warrantless searches are necessary to locate evidence before the
driver leaves the scene and hides or destroys the evidence. Second,
because automobiles are utilized on public roads, they carry a
significantly lower expectation of privacy than homes and are thus
entitled to less constitutional protection. 156

A cell phone generally does not suffer from the same liabilities as
automobiles. First, courts in general have upheld only warrantless
cell phone searches incident-to-arrest. However, when police merely
have probable cause to search a phone, but not arrest the owner,
they generally need to secure a search warrant. 157 Therefore, in the
circumstances most widely accepted by courts for warrantless cell
phone searches (i.e., circumstances involving arrest), the police can
search the phone. This fulfills both prongs of the Chimel rule. Second,
cell phones, while utilized in public, are not subject to extensive

151.
(2008).
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Adam M. Gershowitz, The iPhone Meets the Fourth Amendment, 56 UCLA L. REV. 27, 49

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Adam M. Gershowitz, Texting While Driving Meets the Fourth Amendment: Deterring Both
Texting and Warrantless Cell Phone Searches, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 577, 599 (2012).
157. Id. (“Unlike the search incident to arrest doctrine, which is automatic following a
lawful arrest, the automobile exception is premised on the police having probable cause.”).
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regulation like automobiles. 158 The regulation to which automobiles
are subject significantly reduces the owner’s expectation of privacy.
Without this extensive regulation, the public’s expectation of privacy
in their cell phones is not diminished like the expectation of privacy
in their vehicles. Third, even though cell phones are inherently
mobile, police can more easily confiscated them, preventing the
destruction of evidence. In addition, the information on cell phones
is not as easily visible as the contents of a car are. A Gant-based
solution fits within existing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,
provides increased privacy protection for cell phones, and still
empowers police in limited situations. However, because cell phones
are more like a second mind, the heightened privacy expectation may
make this solution problematic.

B. Cell Phones are Different
Because a Gant-based solution fails to fully protect the privacy
interest in cell phones, the Supreme Court should consider excluding
cell phone searches from the warrant requirement exceptions. Such a
solution would give full weight to the unique and personal character
of cell phones. We need to have a rule for cell phones that is easy for
government officials to follow and apply. Society has become
dependent on cell phones and other electronic storage devices, and
this dependence will only continue to grow. 159 The simplest, and
most workable, way to answer the cell phone dilemma is to exclude
cell phones from the warrant requirement exception. 160 Courts
should require government officials to obtain a warrant before
searching cell phones. 161 Creating exceptions for cell phones based
on memory capacity, and type of information searched only serves to
enhance confusion and multiply litigation. 162 Creating a new rule for
cell phones, and similar electronic storage devices, is the best way to
protect individual privacy.
Creating a rule protecting cell phones, but failing to address
future advances in electronic communications devices would be

158. The regulation of cars is one reason why courts have found cars to have a reduced
expectation of privacy. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985).
159. See Warfield, supra note 130, at 193.
160. Id. at 192.
161. Id.
162. Id.
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impractical. 163 Such a rule would require police officers to memorize
the various electronic devices on the market, which are constantly
changing. 164 In addition, storage capacity on a cell phone or other
device is an immaterial consideration because even “dumb” cell
phones can contain a large amount of information. 165 What is really
needed is a rule that doesn’t change with technology. The Supreme
Court should create a rule that protects “Digital Storage Devices.”
Such a designation would encompass not only cell phones, but also
laptop computers, memory sticks, digital cameras, more recent
advances like the popular tablet computers, and most future
advances in communications technology. Such a designation would
acknowledge the Katz court’s recognition that as technology changes,
so does an individual’s expectation of privacy. Additionally, a
“Digital Storage Device” category would satisfy existing Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. For example, this rule would satisfy both
prongs of the Chimel decision.
First, this designation would do nothing to endanger our law
enforcement personnel. The Park court noted that “[u]nlike other
‘closed containers,’ such as purses or bags which might contain
contraband or weapons, there is no possibility that a cell phone will
contain any dangerous instrumentalities.” 166 And while weapons are
easily hidden on a person’s body or in a traditional container, “there
is apparently no ‘app’ that will turn an iPhone or any other mobile
phone into an effective weapon for use against an arresting officer
(and if there were, officers would presumably seek to disarm the
phone rather than search its data files).” 167
The only credible reason to search a cell phone incident-to-arrest
is to prevent destruction of evidence. Once police have confiscated
the cell phone, this ceases to be a danger. Even the danger of a
remote memory wipe 168 is not that problematic. If a criminal wipes a
phone’s memory remotely, there are ways to recover the lost data. 169

163. Schlossberg v. Solesbee, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1170 (D. Or. 2012).
164. Id.
165. United States v. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d 803, 806 (7th Cir. 2012).
166. United States v. Park, No. CR 05-375 SI, 2007 WL 1521573, at *11 (N.D. Cal. May
23, 2007).
167. MacLean, supra note 8, at 48.
168. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d at 807–8.
169. Kish, supra note 126, at 472 (“[M]ost information, even when ‘deleted’ by a criminal,
can be recovered through forensics in the same way as information found on a computer’s hard
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One problem with this technology is that recovering lost data
requires extra expended resources and delay.170 However, police can
overcome even this obstacle by using a so-called “faraday bag.”
Faraday bags “can be used to dramatically reduce or completely
eliminate any risk of remotely disturbing a cell phone’s internal
memory.” 171 Faraday bags work by blocking external radio waves
and static electrical fields, blocking signals that would wipe a cell
phone’s memory. 172 A small faraday bag big enough to contain a cell
phone can cost as little as ten dollars. 173 Use of faraday bags would
certainly not put a financial hardship on most law-enforcement
agencies nor would it be a hardship for law enforcement to carry
one. 174 When proper steps are taken, losing evidence due to remote
wipes is not much of an issue.
Therefore, because “searching a cell phone’s internal memory
advances neither the need to protect the arresting officers’ safety,
nor the need to preserve evidence,” 175 Chimel does not prevent the
Supreme Court from creating a rule that protects digital storage
devices. In addition, because these devices are like a second mind
with a heightened expectation of privacy, Katz provides the rationale
to protect digital storage devices. 176
VI. CONCLUSION
Even though law enforcement officers may reasonably believe a
phone contains valuable information, that is no reason to suspend
our Fourth Amendment rights. For example, in a drug-related arrest,
one article explained that:

drive.”).
170. See Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d at 808.
171. MacLean, supra note 8, at 50.
172. How Faraday Bags Work, FARADAYBAG.COM, http://www.faradaybag.com/howfaraday-bags-work.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2013).
173. Mobile Phone Blocking Bag, FORENSIC
STORE,
http://forensicstore.com/product/isolation-solutions/mobile-phone-blocking-bag (last visited
Oct. 21, 2013).
174. Cf. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d at 810 (arguing that to carry faraday bags and to be
instructed in faraday bag use would be a burden on law-enforcement agencies).
175. MacLean, supra note 8, at 42.
176. Under this solution, it is likely that the only acceptable exception to the warrant
requirement would be the plain view doctrine. If incriminating evidence is showing on the
screen when the law enforcement officer legally views the phone, that information may be used,
opening a way for the officer to further search the phone.
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Because the cell phone contains call logs and address books, it
would be an obvious target for investigators. That information
could help link a defendant to a particular drug transaction, and it
also could provide authorities with other persons involved in the
illegal activity. The officers may even have seen the defendant using
the cell phone during the commission of a crime. However, these
are precisely the types of situations where probable cause could be
used to obtain a search warrant. 177

If the police have probable cause to get a search warrant, there is
no reason for the police to circumvent constitutional requirements
and conduct a warrantless search. With cell phones constituting a
sort of second mind, the expectation of privacy is heightened, and
Katz demands a warrant. The Chimel justifications do not apply to
cell phones, because cell phones do not pose a danger to police, and
the risk of losing valuable evidence is minimal when compared to the
expectation of privacy. Therefore, the Supreme Court should create a
“digital storage device” category to protect cell phones and other
digital devices from warrantless searches. If the Supreme Court does
this, it will prevent a reasonable expectation of privacy from
becoming unreasonable.

Michael V. Hinckley *

177. Stillwagon, supra note 129, at 1204.
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